Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment

Financial incentives in the form of payment for ecosystem services (PES) can encourage participation in voluntary conservation programs, but real-world experience with PES is limited for services such as the provision of endangered species habitats. A computer-based laboratory experiment with 139 US...

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Autor principal:	Jacob P. Byl
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	payment for ecosystem services voluntary conservation financial incentives experimental empirical law and economics Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/d18718a25389479c8b862c5a4da2d65e
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:d18718a25389479c8b862c5a4da2d65e2021-11-25T19:00:19ZThree Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment10.3390/su1322123462071-1050https://doaj.org/article/d18718a25389479c8b862c5a4da2d65e2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/22/12346https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050Financial incentives in the form of payment for ecosystem services (PES) can encourage participation in voluntary conservation programs, but real-world experience with PES is limited for services such as the provision of endangered species habitats. A computer-based laboratory experiment with 139 US college students as subjects suggests there are three barriers to effective PES programs: (1) financial rewards can crowd out altruism—low-level PES in the experiment was less effective than the same program without PES; (2) landowners may assuage guilt over destroying habitats by making contributions to ineffective conservation programs—participants often paired destruction of habitat with token contributions to conservation efforts; and (3) landowners may strategically exit conservation agreements in ways that are detrimental to wildlife—a large proportion of participants chose to leave agreements and destroy habitats when the PESs were structured without credible deterrence of an early exit. Fortunately, the results of the experiment also suggest research to overcome these barriers by ensuring that PES financial incentives are scaled and structured to effectively promote conservation. The lessons from this study—though they issue from the particular context of this experiment—provide suggestions about how to structure benefit sharing schemes that could be used to promote conservation in a range of settings.Jacob P. BylMDPI AGarticlepayment for ecosystem servicesvoluntary conservationfinancial incentivesexperimentalempiricallaw and economicsEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 12346, p 12346 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	payment for ecosystem services voluntary conservation financial incentives experimental empirical law and economics Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
spellingShingle	payment for ecosystem services voluntary conservation financial incentives experimental empirical law and economics Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350 Jacob P. Byl Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
description	Financial incentives in the form of payment for ecosystem services (PES) can encourage participation in voluntary conservation programs, but real-world experience with PES is limited for services such as the provision of endangered species habitats. A computer-based laboratory experiment with 139 US college students as subjects suggests there are three barriers to effective PES programs: (1) financial rewards can crowd out altruism—low-level PES in the experiment was less effective than the same program without PES; (2) landowners may assuage guilt over destroying habitats by making contributions to ineffective conservation programs—participants often paired destruction of habitat with token contributions to conservation efforts; and (3) landowners may strategically exit conservation agreements in ways that are detrimental to wildlife—a large proportion of participants chose to leave agreements and destroy habitats when the PESs were structured without credible deterrence of an early exit. Fortunately, the results of the experiment also suggest research to overcome these barriers by ensuring that PES financial incentives are scaled and structured to effectively promote conservation. The lessons from this study—though they issue from the particular context of this experiment—provide suggestions about how to structure benefit sharing schemes that could be used to promote conservation in a range of settings.
format	article
author	Jacob P. Byl
author_facet	Jacob P. Byl
author_sort	Jacob P. Byl
title	Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
title_short	Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
title_full	Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
title_fullStr	Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
title_full_unstemmed	Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment
title_sort	three barriers to effective programs with payment for ecosystem services: behavioral responses in a computer-based experiment
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/d18718a25389479c8b862c5a4da2d65e
work_keys_str_mv	AT jacobpbyl threebarrierstoeffectiveprogramswithpaymentforecosystemservicesbehavioralresponsesinacomputerbasedexperiment
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Three Barriers to Effective Programs with Payment for Ecosystem Services: Behavioral Responses in a Computer-Based Experiment

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