Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution

This paper examines the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules by way of the philosophical dispute between John Searle and Joseph Raz. These theorists disagree inasmuch as Searle claims that constitutive and regulative rules represent distinct types, while Raz argues that such a diff...

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Autor principal:	Adriana Placani
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	constitutive rules regulative rules Searle Raz normative reasons Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/d34b1db681b749258d047486ec27ee9d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:d34b1db681b749258d047486ec27ee9d2021-12-02T10:30:26ZConstitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution10.13128/Phe_Mi-224292280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/d34b1db681b749258d047486ec27ee9d2017-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7289https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This paper examines the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules by way of the philosophical dispute between John Searle and Joseph Raz. These theorists disagree inasmuch as Searle claims that constitutive and regulative rules represent distinct types, while Raz argues that such a differentiation is untenable. This work acknowledges the merits of Raz’s position, but argues that Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is sound given certain refinements. The paper argues that the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules should be grounded on the rules’ distinct capacity for guidance (i.e., whether or not the rules themselves constitute normative reasons for action for subjects). Adriana PlacaniRosenberg & Sellierarticleconstitutive rulesregulative rulesSearleRaznormative reasonsAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 13 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	constitutive rules regulative rules Searle Raz normative reasons Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	constitutive rules regulative rules Searle Raz normative reasons Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Adriana Placani Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
description	This paper examines the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules by way of the philosophical dispute between John Searle and Joseph Raz. These theorists disagree inasmuch as Searle claims that constitutive and regulative rules represent distinct types, while Raz argues that such a differentiation is untenable. This work acknowledges the merits of Raz’s position, but argues that Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is sound given certain refinements. The paper argues that the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules should be grounded on the rules’ distinct capacity for guidance (i.e., whether or not the rules themselves constitute normative reasons for action for subjects).
format	article
author	Adriana Placani
author_facet	Adriana Placani
author_sort	Adriana Placani
title	Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
title_short	Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
title_full	Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
title_fullStr	Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
title_full_unstemmed	Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution
title_sort	constitutive and regulative rules: a dispute and a resolution
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/d34b1db681b749258d047486ec27ee9d
work_keys_str_mv	AT adrianaplacani constitutiveandregulativerulesadisputeandaresolution
_version_	1718397147262484480

Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution

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