A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals

Abstract People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander eff...

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Autor principal:	Jeffrey C. Schank
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/d3aefac36ff744d6aa64338f132ee6bd
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:d3aefac36ff744d6aa64338f132ee6bd2021-12-02T16:30:10ZA model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals10.1038/s41598-021-94811-32045-2322https://doaj.org/article/d3aefac36ff744d6aa64338f132ee6bd2021-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-94811-3https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander effect and congestible altruism. These studies have found that people are less generous when there are others who could be generous (the bystander effect) and also less generous when there are multiple recipients (congestible altruism) though the sum of their generosity to all recipients increases. A working hypothesis is proposed that the context-sensitive generosity observed in n-person DGs can be explained as equitable behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, explaining the evolution of equitable behavior is challenging at best. To provide an evolutionary explanation, a second working hypothesis is proposed: equitable offers evolve because they reduce resource deficits produced by variability in the accumulation of resources and thereby minimize the length of interbirth intervals (IBIs) and increase fitness. Based on this working hypothesis, an evolutionary model was developed for n-person DGs to investigate the evolution of equitable offers as a resource allocation problem when reproduction is constrained by IBIs. Simulations demonstrated that equitable offers could evolve in group-structured populations when there is a cost (i.e., longer IBIs) to running resource deficits. Mean evolved offers also varied as a function of the number of dictators and recipients in patterns consistent with the bystander effect and congestible altruism. Equitable offers evolved because they reduced resource variability among group members and thereby reduced resource deficits, which insured higher average rates of reproduction for more equitable groups of agents. Implications of these results are discussed.Jeffrey C. SchankNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-13 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Jeffrey C. Schank A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
description	Abstract People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander effect and congestible altruism. These studies have found that people are less generous when there are others who could be generous (the bystander effect) and also less generous when there are multiple recipients (congestible altruism) though the sum of their generosity to all recipients increases. A working hypothesis is proposed that the context-sensitive generosity observed in n-person DGs can be explained as equitable behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, explaining the evolution of equitable behavior is challenging at best. To provide an evolutionary explanation, a second working hypothesis is proposed: equitable offers evolve because they reduce resource deficits produced by variability in the accumulation of resources and thereby minimize the length of interbirth intervals (IBIs) and increase fitness. Based on this working hypothesis, an evolutionary model was developed for n-person DGs to investigate the evolution of equitable offers as a resource allocation problem when reproduction is constrained by IBIs. Simulations demonstrated that equitable offers could evolve in group-structured populations when there is a cost (i.e., longer IBIs) to running resource deficits. Mean evolved offers also varied as a function of the number of dictators and recipients in patterns consistent with the bystander effect and congestible altruism. Equitable offers evolved because they reduced resource variability among group members and thereby reduced resource deficits, which insured higher average rates of reproduction for more equitable groups of agents. Implications of these results are discussed.
format	article
author	Jeffrey C. Schank
author_facet	Jeffrey C. Schank
author_sort	Jeffrey C. Schank
title	A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
title_short	A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
title_full	A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
title_fullStr	A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
title_full_unstemmed	A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
title_sort	model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/d3aefac36ff744d6aa64338f132ee6bd
work_keys_str_mv	AT jeffreycschank amodeloftheevolutionofequitableoffersinnpersondictatorgameswithinterbirthintervals AT jeffreycschank modeloftheevolutionofequitableoffersinnpersondictatorgameswithinterbirthintervals
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A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals

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