A model of the evolution of equitable offers in n-person dictator games with interbirth intervals

Abstract People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander eff...

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Autor principal: Jeffrey C. Schank
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/d3aefac36ff744d6aa64338f132ee6bd
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