Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks

Abstract Despite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual co...

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Autores principales:	Kaipeng Hu, Yewei Tao, Yongjuan Ma, Lei Shi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/d3b56582879b4b5991ee6c1c48614263
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:d3b56582879b4b5991ee6c1c486142632021-12-02T18:49:34ZPeer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks10.1038/s41598-021-95303-02045-2322https://doaj.org/article/d3b56582879b4b5991ee6c1c486142632021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95303-0https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Despite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.Kaipeng HuYewei TaoYongjuan MaLei ShiNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Kaipeng Hu Yewei Tao Yongjuan Ma Lei Shi Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
description	Abstract Despite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.
format	article
author	Kaipeng Hu Yewei Tao Yongjuan Ma Lei Shi
author_facet	Kaipeng Hu Yewei Tao Yongjuan Ma Lei Shi
author_sort	Kaipeng Hu
title	Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
title_short	Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
title_full	Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
title_fullStr	Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
title_full_unstemmed	Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
title_sort	peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/d3b56582879b4b5991ee6c1c48614263
work_keys_str_mv	AT kaipenghu peerpressureinducedpunishmentresolvessocialdilemmaoninterdependentnetworks AT yeweitao peerpressureinducedpunishmentresolvessocialdilemmaoninterdependentnetworks AT yongjuanma peerpressureinducedpunishmentresolvessocialdilemmaoninterdependentnetworks AT leishi peerpressureinducedpunishmentresolvessocialdilemmaoninterdependentnetworks
_version_	1718377592486100992

Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks

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