Epistocracy and democratic epistemology

Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reason...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Min John B.
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CS EN SK
Publicado:	Sciendo 2015
Materias:	epistemic democracy epistocracy epistemic proceduralism david estlund collective wisdom democratic epistemology Political science J
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/d408d196012a4995b3e5b21042133425
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:d408d196012a4995b3e5b21042133425
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:d408d196012a4995b3e5b210421334252021-12-02T19:09:23ZEpistocracy and democratic epistemology1801-342210.1515/pce-2015-0005https://doaj.org/article/d408d196012a4995b3e5b210421334252015-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1515/pce-2015-0005https://doaj.org/toc/1801-3422Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.Min John B.Sciendoarticleepistemic democracyepistocracyepistemic proceduralismdavid estlundcollective wisdomdemocratic epistemologyPolitical scienceJCSENSKPolitics in Central Europe, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 91-112 (2015)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CS EN SK
topic	epistemic democracy epistocracy epistemic proceduralism david estlund collective wisdom democratic epistemology Political science J
spellingShingle	epistemic democracy epistocracy epistemic proceduralism david estlund collective wisdom democratic epistemology Political science J Min John B. Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
description	Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.
format	article
author	Min John B.
author_facet	Min John B.
author_sort	Min John B.
title	Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
title_short	Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
title_full	Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
title_fullStr	Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
title_full_unstemmed	Epistocracy and democratic epistemology
title_sort	epistocracy and democratic epistemology
publisher	Sciendo
publishDate	2015
url	https://doaj.org/article/d408d196012a4995b3e5b21042133425
work_keys_str_mv	AT minjohnb epistocracyanddemocraticepistemology
_version_	1718377118210981888

Epistocracy and democratic epistemology

Ejemplares similares