Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2018
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oai:doaj.org-article:d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa22021-12-02T10:23:37ZModes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*10.13128/Phe_Mi-236692280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa22018-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7317https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.Elisabetta SacchiRosenberg & Sellierarticleperceptual awarenessacquaintanceperceptual contactAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 14 (2018) |
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perceptual awareness acquaintance perceptual contact Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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perceptual awareness acquaintance perceptual contact Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Elisabetta Sacchi Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
description |
There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it. |
format |
article |
author |
Elisabetta Sacchi |
author_facet |
Elisabetta Sacchi |
author_sort |
Elisabetta Sacchi |
title |
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
title_short |
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
title_full |
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
title_fullStr |
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
title_full_unstemmed |
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account* |
title_sort |
modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of evans’s account* |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa2 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT elisabettasacchi modesofpresentationandwaysofappearingacriticalrevisionofevanssaccount |
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1718397321278914560 |