Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*

There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the...

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Autor principal: Elisabetta Sacchi
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Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2018
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa2
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa22021-12-02T10:23:37ZModes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*10.13128/Phe_Mi-236692280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa22018-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7317https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.Elisabetta SacchiRosenberg & Sellierarticleperceptual awarenessacquaintanceperceptual contactAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 14 (2018)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic perceptual awareness
acquaintance
perceptual contact
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle perceptual awareness
acquaintance
perceptual contact
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Elisabetta Sacchi
Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
description There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.
format article
author Elisabetta Sacchi
author_facet Elisabetta Sacchi
author_sort Elisabetta Sacchi
title Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
title_short Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
title_full Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
title_fullStr Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
title_full_unstemmed Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*
title_sort modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of evans’s account*
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2018
url https://doaj.org/article/d5e19804482f4be2841b3c4b1db48aa2
work_keys_str_mv AT elisabettasacchi modesofpresentationandwaysofappearingacriticalrevisionofevanssaccount
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