Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology

Since neuroimaging methods allow researchers to study the human brain at work, the vexed mind-brain problem ceased to be just a metaphysical issue, and became a practical concern for Cognitive Neuroscientists: how could they carve mind and brain into distinct entities, and what is the relation betw...

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Autor principal: Marco Viola
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Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/d75baf47a2354f41b069f46abc3a2c67
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:d75baf47a2354f41b069f46abc3a2c672021-12-02T12:19:25ZCarving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology10.13128/Phe_Mi-211152280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/d75baf47a2354f41b069f46abc3a2c672017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7275https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Since neuroimaging methods allow researchers to study the human brain at work, the vexed mind-brain problem ceased to be just a metaphysical issue, and became a practical concern for Cognitive Neuroscientists: how could they carve mind and brain into distinct entities, and what is the relation between these two sets? In this paper, I discuss the classical model of one-to-one mappings between mental and neural entities, inherited from phrenology, and make its assumptions explicit. I then examine the shortcomings of this “new phrenology”, and explore two solutions to them: the first accepts many-to-many mappings, whereas the second proposes a radically rethinking of the relata of this correspondence. Marco ViolaRosenberg & Sellierarticlephilosophy of neurosciencephilosophy of psychologycognitive ontologyone-to-one mappingAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 12 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic philosophy of neuroscience
philosophy of psychology
cognitive ontology
one-to-one mapping
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle philosophy of neuroscience
philosophy of psychology
cognitive ontology
one-to-one mapping
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Marco Viola
Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
description Since neuroimaging methods allow researchers to study the human brain at work, the vexed mind-brain problem ceased to be just a metaphysical issue, and became a practical concern for Cognitive Neuroscientists: how could they carve mind and brain into distinct entities, and what is the relation between these two sets? In this paper, I discuss the classical model of one-to-one mappings between mental and neural entities, inherited from phrenology, and make its assumptions explicit. I then examine the shortcomings of this “new phrenology”, and explore two solutions to them: the first accepts many-to-many mappings, whereas the second proposes a radically rethinking of the relata of this correspondence.
format article
author Marco Viola
author_facet Marco Viola
author_sort Marco Viola
title Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
title_short Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
title_full Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
title_fullStr Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
title_full_unstemmed Carving Mind at Brain’s Joints. The Debate on Cognitive Ontology
title_sort carving mind at brain’s joints. the debate on cognitive ontology
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/d75baf47a2354f41b069f46abc3a2c67
work_keys_str_mv AT marcoviola carvingmindatbrainsjointsthedebateoncognitiveontology
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