Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?

Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the...

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Autor principal:	Daria Vitasovic
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	intentionality phenomenology unconscious Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/dac47a4f6feb4db19e19300308910e9a
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:dac47a4f6feb4db19e19300308910e9a2021-12-02T13:03:27ZUnconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?10.13128/Phe_Mi-200992280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/dac47a4f6feb4db19e19300308910e9a2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7236https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the incompatibility of PIT with the claim of Unconscious Intentionality (UI), or more precisely, the claim that there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. There are two ways in which the proponents of PIT proceed. Most philosophers argue for some relation of derivation of unconscious intentional states from conscious phenomenally intentional states. Firstly, I argue that this option is abandoning the program. Thus, the only way one can proceed, if one wishes to remain within the PIT framework, is to argue for genuine unconscious phenomenal intentionality. Secondly, I consider Pitt’s proposal for unconscious phenomenal intentionality. I argue that, while Pitt stays within the PIT framework, his model does not take into account the necessity of the self for phenomenal (un)consciousness. Lastly, I suggest an outline of a third approach, based on Pitt’s proposal, that takes into account the necessity of subject for intentionality or what-is-it-like-for-me-ness. Daria VitasovicRosenberg & SellierarticleintentionalityphenomenologyunconsciousAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	intentionality phenomenology unconscious Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	intentionality phenomenology unconscious Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Daria Vitasovic Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
description	Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the incompatibility of PIT with the claim of Unconscious Intentionality (UI), or more precisely, the claim that there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. There are two ways in which the proponents of PIT proceed. Most philosophers argue for some relation of derivation of unconscious intentional states from conscious phenomenally intentional states. Firstly, I argue that this option is abandoning the program. Thus, the only way one can proceed, if one wishes to remain within the PIT framework, is to argue for genuine unconscious phenomenal intentionality. Secondly, I consider Pitt’s proposal for unconscious phenomenal intentionality. I argue that, while Pitt stays within the PIT framework, his model does not take into account the necessity of the self for phenomenal (un)consciousness. Lastly, I suggest an outline of a third approach, based on Pitt’s proposal, that takes into account the necessity of subject for intentionality or what-is-it-like-for-me-ness.
format	article
author	Daria Vitasovic
author_facet	Daria Vitasovic
author_sort	Daria Vitasovic
title	Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
title_short	Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
title_full	Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
title_fullStr	Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
title_full_unstemmed	Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
title_sort	unconscious content: what is it like to think that p when there is nothing it is like?
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/dac47a4f6feb4db19e19300308910e9a
work_keys_str_mv	AT dariavitasovic unconsciouscontentwhatisitliketothinkthatpwhenthereisnothingitislike
_version_	1718393533601153024

Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?

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