Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?
Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the...
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Auteur principal: | Daria Vitasovic |
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Format: | article |
Langue: | EN FR IT |
Publié: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/dac47a4f6feb4db19e19300308910e9a |
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