Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence

In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-who...

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Autor principal: Francesca De Vecchi
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FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f6
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f62021-12-02T10:31:06ZEidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence10.13128/Phe_Mi-224312280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f62017-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7291https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of legal provisions by citizens. I suggest that Stein’s work on the integrative acts of legal provisions is grounded in the eidetic claim that essential parts of a whole also include possible – and not only necessary – parts, and that these are essential relations of tendency: legal provisions tend essentially to be fulfilled and their existence acquires a full sense only when they are enforced. Finally, I deal with eidetics and the issue of degrees and quality of existence in social ontology. Francesca De VecchiRosenberg & Sellierarticleeideticslaw-making actsparts and wholesdegrees of constraintAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 13 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic eidetics
law-making acts
parts and wholes
degrees of constraint
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle eidetics
law-making acts
parts and wholes
degrees of constraint
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Francesca De Vecchi
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
description In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of legal provisions by citizens. I suggest that Stein’s work on the integrative acts of legal provisions is grounded in the eidetic claim that essential parts of a whole also include possible – and not only necessary – parts, and that these are essential relations of tendency: legal provisions tend essentially to be fulfilled and their existence acquires a full sense only when they are enforced. Finally, I deal with eidetics and the issue of degrees and quality of existence in social ontology.
format article
author Francesca De Vecchi
author_facet Francesca De Vecchi
author_sort Francesca De Vecchi
title Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
title_short Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
title_full Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
title_fullStr Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
title_full_unstemmed Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
title_sort eidetics of law-making acts: parts, wholes and degrees of existence
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f6
work_keys_str_mv AT francescadevecchi eideticsoflawmakingactspartswholesanddegreesofexistence
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