Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence
In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-who...
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2017
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oai:doaj.org-article:db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f62021-12-02T10:31:06ZEidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence10.13128/Phe_Mi-224312280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f62017-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7291https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of legal provisions by citizens. I suggest that Stein’s work on the integrative acts of legal provisions is grounded in the eidetic claim that essential parts of a whole also include possible – and not only necessary – parts, and that these are essential relations of tendency: legal provisions tend essentially to be fulfilled and their existence acquires a full sense only when they are enforced. Finally, I deal with eidetics and the issue of degrees and quality of existence in social ontology. Francesca De VecchiRosenberg & Sellierarticleeideticslaw-making actsparts and wholesdegrees of constraintAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 13 (2017) |
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eidetics law-making acts parts and wholes degrees of constraint Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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eidetics law-making acts parts and wholes degrees of constraint Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Francesca De Vecchi Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
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In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of legal provisions by citizens. I suggest that Stein’s work on the integrative acts of legal provisions is grounded in the eidetic claim that essential parts of a whole also include possible – and not only necessary – parts, and that these are essential relations of tendency: legal provisions tend essentially to be fulfilled and their existence acquires a full sense only when they are enforced. Finally, I deal with eidetics and the issue of degrees and quality of existence in social ontology.
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format |
article |
author |
Francesca De Vecchi |
author_facet |
Francesca De Vecchi |
author_sort |
Francesca De Vecchi |
title |
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
title_short |
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
title_full |
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
title_fullStr |
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
title_full_unstemmed |
Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence |
title_sort |
eidetics of law-making acts: parts, wholes and degrees of existence |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/db71a0e463844553965a1e68fae878f6 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT francescadevecchi eideticsoflawmakingactspartswholesanddegreesofexistence |
_version_ |
1718397149774872576 |