Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context
According to Searle, for there to be collective intentionality two elements must be present: an intention-in-action to collectively do something and a belief in the cooperative attitude of other participants. The author argues that this second element poses the requirement of giving an account of t...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:db888d964a8441d5a6fd5208ed67494b2021-12-02T12:05:48ZOther Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context10.13128/Phe_Mi-196322280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/db888d964a8441d5a6fd5208ed67494b2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7079https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 According to Searle, for there to be collective intentionality two elements must be present: an intention-in-action to collectively do something and a belief in the cooperative attitude of other participants. The author argues that this second element poses the requirement of giving an account of the epistemological basis for holding the belief. The author claims that we cannot extend the way in which, according to Searle, the epistemological basis exists in game-like activities to legal institutional facts, in these last cases, due to the fact that legal norms are discussed in midgame and the fact that legal interpretation is highly indeterminate, it is dubious that such a basis exists. Federico José ArenaRosenberg & Sellierarticleepistemological basisgame-like activitiesAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 2 (2016) |
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EN FR IT |
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epistemological basis game-like activities Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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epistemological basis game-like activities Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Federico José Arena Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
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According to Searle, for there to be collective intentionality two elements must be present: an intention-in-action to collectively do something and a belief in the cooperative attitude of other participants. The author argues that this second element poses the requirement of giving an account of the epistemological basis for holding the belief. The author claims that we cannot extend the way in which, according to Searle, the epistemological basis exists in game-like activities to legal institutional facts, in these last cases, due to the fact that legal norms are discussed in midgame and the fact that legal interpretation is highly indeterminate, it is dubious that such a basis exists.
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format |
article |
author |
Federico José Arena |
author_facet |
Federico José Arena |
author_sort |
Federico José Arena |
title |
Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
title_short |
Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
title_full |
Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
title_fullStr |
Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
title_full_unstemmed |
Other Participants' Cooperative Attitude in Legal Context |
title_sort |
other participants' cooperative attitude in legal context |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/db888d964a8441d5a6fd5208ed67494b |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT federicojosearena otherparticipantscooperativeattitudeinlegalcontext |
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