Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory

Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinatio...

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Autor principal:	Neil W. Williams
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	atomism plural subject theory voluntarism social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e9
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e9
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e92021-12-02T10:23:37ZAgainst Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory10.13128/Phe_Mi-196082280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e92016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7090https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what constitutes a social group. Here I will argue that theories which rely on this methodology are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all social groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. I focus on the workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by Margaret Gilbert in On Social Facts (1989). I show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. I examine the elements within Plural Subject Theory which protect Gilbert from these accusations of circularity, and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or embedded individuals. Neil W. WilliamsRosenberg & Sellierarticleatomismplural subject theoryvoluntarismsocial ontologyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 3 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	atomism plural subject theory voluntarism social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	atomism plural subject theory voluntarism social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Neil W. Williams Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
description	Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what constitutes a social group. Here I will argue that theories which rely on this methodology are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all social groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. I focus on the workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by Margaret Gilbert in On Social Facts (1989). I show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. I examine the elements within Plural Subject Theory which protect Gilbert from these accusations of circularity, and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or embedded individuals.
format	article
author	Neil W. Williams
author_facet	Neil W. Williams
author_sort	Neil W. Williams
title	Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
title_short	Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
title_full	Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
title_fullStr	Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
title_full_unstemmed	Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
title_sort	against atomic individualism in plural subject theory
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e9
work_keys_str_mv	AT neilwwilliams againstatomicindividualisminpluralsubjecttheory
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Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory

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