Against Atomic Individualism in Plural Subject Theory
Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinatio...
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Main Author: | Neil W. Williams |
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Format: | article |
Language: | EN FR IT |
Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/dba983e0df714ec89120bc4eb41fc9e9 |
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