Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines

This article seeks to ascertain whether local governments make improper use of their discretion and use pecuniary sanctions for electoral purposes. To this end, a sample of Spanish municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 citizens during the period 2010 to 2016 has been used. Our results...

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Autores principales:	Bernardino Benito, María-Dolores Guillamón, Ana-María Ríos
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	SAGE Publishing 2021
Materias:	History of scholarship and learning. The humanities AZ20-999 Social Sciences H
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/dc57b4fbf0f84112ac20dbe139a77e16
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:dc57b4fbf0f84112ac20dbe139a77e162021-11-18T00:33:35ZPolitical Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines2158-244010.1177/21582440211059169https://doaj.org/article/dc57b4fbf0f84112ac20dbe139a77e162021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211059169https://doaj.org/toc/2158-2440This article seeks to ascertain whether local governments make improper use of their discretion and use pecuniary sanctions for electoral purposes. To this end, a sample of Spanish municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 citizens during the period 2010 to 2016 has been used. Our results show that revenues from fines are influenced by the presence of elections. In particular, we find that local governments in an election year reduce the percentage of fines, measured either over total non-financial revenues or in per capita terms. This reduction, compared to the pre-election year, suggests that politicians use their discretionary power to issue fewer fines in election years, as they are aware that penalties are not well-regarded by citizens. In addition, we find that the most indebted municipalities, those governed by right-wing parties and the most fragmented municipalities tend to collect more revenues from fines in the pre-election year. Finally, other factors influencing revenues from fines are the number of inhabitants of the municipality, the sources of external funding that the local government has, the ideology of the rulers and their political strength.Bernardino BenitoMaría-Dolores GuillamónAna-María RíosSAGE PublishingarticleHistory of scholarship and learning. The humanitiesAZ20-999Social SciencesHENSAGE Open, Vol 11 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	History of scholarship and learning. The humanities AZ20-999 Social Sciences H
spellingShingle	History of scholarship and learning. The humanities AZ20-999 Social Sciences H Bernardino Benito María-Dolores Guillamón Ana-María Ríos Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
description	This article seeks to ascertain whether local governments make improper use of their discretion and use pecuniary sanctions for electoral purposes. To this end, a sample of Spanish municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 citizens during the period 2010 to 2016 has been used. Our results show that revenues from fines are influenced by the presence of elections. In particular, we find that local governments in an election year reduce the percentage of fines, measured either over total non-financial revenues or in per capita terms. This reduction, compared to the pre-election year, suggests that politicians use their discretionary power to issue fewer fines in election years, as they are aware that penalties are not well-regarded by citizens. In addition, we find that the most indebted municipalities, those governed by right-wing parties and the most fragmented municipalities tend to collect more revenues from fines in the pre-election year. Finally, other factors influencing revenues from fines are the number of inhabitants of the municipality, the sources of external funding that the local government has, the ideology of the rulers and their political strength.
format	article
author	Bernardino Benito María-Dolores Guillamón Ana-María Ríos
author_facet	Bernardino Benito María-Dolores Guillamón Ana-María Ríos
author_sort	Bernardino Benito
title	Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
title_short	Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
title_full	Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
title_fullStr	Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
title_full_unstemmed	Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines
title_sort	political budget cycles in public revenues: evidence from fines
publisher	SAGE Publishing
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/dc57b4fbf0f84112ac20dbe139a77e16
work_keys_str_mv	AT bernardinobenito politicalbudgetcyclesinpublicrevenuesevidencefromfines AT mariadoloresguillamon politicalbudgetcyclesinpublicrevenuesevidencefromfines AT anamariarios politicalbudgetcyclesinpublicrevenuesevidencefromfines
_version_	1718425194456940544

Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines

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