The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” a...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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oai:doaj.org-article:de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e52021-12-02T10:23:37ZThe Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation10.13128/Phe_Mi-200912280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e52017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7228https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend. Marta JorbaRosenberg & Sellierarticlecognitive phenomenologyphenomenal charactercognitive accessco-extensionAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017) |
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EN FR IT |
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cognitive phenomenology phenomenal character cognitive access co-extension Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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cognitive phenomenology phenomenal character cognitive access co-extension Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Marta Jorba The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
description |
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.
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format |
article |
author |
Marta Jorba |
author_facet |
Marta Jorba |
author_sort |
Marta Jorba |
title |
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
title_short |
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
title_full |
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
title_fullStr |
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation |
title_sort |
conscious and phenomenal character of thought: reflections on their possible dissociation |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e5 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT martajorba theconsciousandphenomenalcharacterofthoughtreflectionsontheirpossibledissociation AT martajorba consciousandphenomenalcharacterofthoughtreflectionsontheirpossibledissociation |
_version_ |
1718397323925520384 |