The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation

In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” a...

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Autor principal: Marta Jorba
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IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e5
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e52021-12-02T10:23:37ZThe Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation10.13128/Phe_Mi-200912280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e52017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7228https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend. Marta JorbaRosenberg & Sellierarticlecognitive phenomenologyphenomenal charactercognitive accessco-extensionAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic cognitive phenomenology
phenomenal character
cognitive access
co-extension
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle cognitive phenomenology
phenomenal character
cognitive access
co-extension
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Marta Jorba
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
description In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.
format article
author Marta Jorba
author_facet Marta Jorba
author_sort Marta Jorba
title The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
title_short The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
title_full The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
title_fullStr The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
title_full_unstemmed The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
title_sort conscious and phenomenal character of thought: reflections on their possible dissociation
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e5
work_keys_str_mv AT martajorba theconsciousandphenomenalcharacterofthoughtreflectionsontheirpossibledissociation
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