The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” a...
Guardado en:
Autor principal: | Marta Jorba |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/de67175b19ec45feaff18d498500e5e5 |
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