Assertion and the Varieties of Norms

This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there...

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Autor principal:	Paolo Labinaz
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	assertion norms of assertion conversational maxims speech act theory Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e28a789fd61243f7afeab450db65f787
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e28a789fd61243f7afeab450db65f7872021-12-02T05:46:36ZAssertion and the Varieties of Norms10.13128/Phe_Mi-211102280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/e28a789fd61243f7afeab450db65f7872017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7270https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there are some norms that can be seen to apply to assertion in a more intimate way than others, and these norms can be shown to be constitutive of it, since it is by means of them that we can account for specific defects pertaining to the making of an assertion, which the reliance on contextually variable norms (such as the conversational maxims of Grice to which he refers) does not seem able to do. Paolo LabinazRosenberg & Sellierarticleassertionnorms of assertionconversational maximsspeech act theoryAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 12 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	assertion norms of assertion conversational maxims speech act theory Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	assertion norms of assertion conversational maxims speech act theory Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Paolo Labinaz Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
description	This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there are some norms that can be seen to apply to assertion in a more intimate way than others, and these norms can be shown to be constitutive of it, since it is by means of them that we can account for specific defects pertaining to the making of an assertion, which the reliance on contextually variable norms (such as the conversational maxims of Grice to which he refers) does not seem able to do.
format	article
author	Paolo Labinaz
author_facet	Paolo Labinaz
author_sort	Paolo Labinaz
title	Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
title_short	Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
title_full	Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
title_fullStr	Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
title_full_unstemmed	Assertion and the Varieties of Norms
title_sort	assertion and the varieties of norms
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/e28a789fd61243f7afeab450db65f787
work_keys_str_mv	AT paololabinaz assertionandthevarietiesofnorms
_version_	1718400264016232448

Assertion and the Varieties of Norms

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