The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience...

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Auteur principal: Elisabetta Sacchi
Format: article
Langue:EN
FR
IT
Publié: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db
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Résumé:The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.