The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience...

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Auteur principal:	Elisabetta Sacchi
Format:	article
Langue:	EN FR IT
Publié:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Sujets:	representationalism particularity phenomenological indistinguishability Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Accès en ligne:	https://doaj.org/article/e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db2021-12-02T13:03:28ZThe Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience10.13128/Phe_Mi-195962280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7115https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience. Elisabetta SacchiRosenberg & Sellierarticlerepresentationalismparticularityphenomenological indistinguishabilityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 4 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	representationalism particularity phenomenological indistinguishability Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	representationalism particularity phenomenological indistinguishability Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Elisabetta Sacchi The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
description	The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.
format	article
author	Elisabetta Sacchi
author_facet	Elisabetta Sacchi
author_sort	Elisabetta Sacchi
title	The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
title_short	The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
title_full	The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
title_fullStr	The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
title_full_unstemmed	The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
title_sort	content and phenomenology of perceptual experience
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db
work_keys_str_mv	AT elisabettasacchi thecontentandphenomenologyofperceptualexperience AT elisabettasacchi contentandphenomenologyofperceptualexperience
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The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

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