The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience...
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Auteur principal: | Elisabetta Sacchi |
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Format: | article |
Langue: | EN FR IT |
Publié: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/e2afef3901764089a6f648dda51fe4db |
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