Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.

"Barbarism" is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis-the formation of "barbarian" societies adjace...

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Autor principal:	Doug Jones
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e2b3b0a6d9d04727a1a9e4bb38692b78
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e2b3b0a6d9d04727a1a9e4bb38692b782021-12-02T20:14:35ZBarbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0254240https://doaj.org/article/e2b3b0a6d9d04727a1a9e4bb38692b782021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254240https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203"Barbarism" is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis-the formation of "barbarian" societies adjacent to more complex societies-and its consequences, and applies the model to the case of Europe in the first millennium CE. A starting point is a game (developed by Hirshleifer) in which two players allocate their resources either to producing wealth or to fighting over wealth. The paradoxical result is that a richer and potentially more powerful player may lose out to a poorer player, because the opportunity cost of fighting is greater for the former. In a more elaborate spatial model with many players, the outcome is a wealth-power mismatch: central regions have comparatively more wealth than power, peripheral regions have comparatively more power than wealth. In a model of historical dynamics, a wealth-power mismatch generates a long-lasting decline in social complexity, sweeping from more to less developed regions, until wealth and power come to be more closely aligned. This article reviews how well this model fits the historical record of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe both quantitatively and qualitatively. The article also considers some of the history left out of the model, and why the model doesn't apply to the modern world.Doug JonesPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 9, p e0254240 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Doug Jones Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
description	"Barbarism" is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis-the formation of "barbarian" societies adjacent to more complex societies-and its consequences, and applies the model to the case of Europe in the first millennium CE. A starting point is a game (developed by Hirshleifer) in which two players allocate their resources either to producing wealth or to fighting over wealth. The paradoxical result is that a richer and potentially more powerful player may lose out to a poorer player, because the opportunity cost of fighting is greater for the former. In a more elaborate spatial model with many players, the outcome is a wealth-power mismatch: central regions have comparatively more wealth than power, peripheral regions have comparatively more power than wealth. In a model of historical dynamics, a wealth-power mismatch generates a long-lasting decline in social complexity, sweeping from more to less developed regions, until wealth and power come to be more closely aligned. This article reviews how well this model fits the historical record of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe both quantitatively and qualitatively. The article also considers some of the history left out of the model, and why the model doesn't apply to the modern world.
format	article
author	Doug Jones
author_facet	Doug Jones
author_sort	Doug Jones
title	Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
title_short	Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
title_full	Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
title_fullStr	Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
title_full_unstemmed	Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.
title_sort	barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: rome and after.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/e2b3b0a6d9d04727a1a9e4bb38692b78
work_keys_str_mv	AT dougjones barbarigenesisandthecollapseofcomplexsocietiesromeandafter
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Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after.

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