“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy

Abstract Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertai...

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Autores principales:	Gabriele Chierchia, Rosemarie Nagel, Giorgio Coricelli
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2018
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f2021-12-02T11:40:25Z“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy10.1038/s41598-018-21962-12045-2322https://doaj.org/article/e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f2018-02-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-21962-1https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects’ certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.Gabriele ChierchiaRosemarie NagelGiorgio CoricelliNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-11 (2018)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Gabriele Chierchia Rosemarie Nagel Giorgio Coricelli “Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
description	Abstract Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects’ certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.
format	article
author	Gabriele Chierchia Rosemarie Nagel Giorgio Coricelli
author_facet	Gabriele Chierchia Rosemarie Nagel Giorgio Coricelli
author_sort	Gabriele Chierchia
title	“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
title_short	“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
title_full	“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
title_fullStr	“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
title_full_unstemmed	“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
title_sort	“betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2018
url	https://doaj.org/article/e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f
work_keys_str_mv	AT gabrielechierchia bettingonnatureorbettingonothersanticoordinationinducesuniquelyhighlevelsofentropy AT rosemarienagel bettingonnatureorbettingonothersanticoordinationinducesuniquelyhighlevelsofentropy AT giorgiocoricelli bettingonnatureorbettingonothersanticoordinationinducesuniquelyhighlevelsofentropy
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“Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy

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