Evolving cooperation in multichannel games
Most evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for ‘multichannel games’ in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games.
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Autores principales: | Kate Donahue, Oliver P. Hauser, Martin A. Nowak, Christian Hilbe |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/e50b86e746fb46ccaed8e2aa73b7824f |
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