Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?

EU securities regulation has established a taxonomy of environmentally sustainable activities. This article discusses, from a law and economics standpoint, the potential of this taxonomy to support sustainable corporate governance. Corporate governance can be an efficient way to channel investor pre...

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Autor principal: Alessio M. Pacces
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/e5a78aa04d6340f794da60a920bf93d5
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:e5a78aa04d6340f794da60a920bf93d52021-11-11T19:51:20ZWill the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?10.3390/su1321123162071-1050https://doaj.org/article/e5a78aa04d6340f794da60a920bf93d52021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/21/12316https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050EU securities regulation has established a taxonomy of environmentally sustainable activities. This article discusses, from a law and economics standpoint, the potential of this taxonomy to support sustainable corporate governance. Corporate governance can be an efficient way to channel investor preferences towards sustainability because the concentration of institutional shareholding has lowered the transaction costs of shareholder action. However, there is a principal-agent problem between institutional investors and their beneficiaries, which depends on greenwashing and undermines sustainable corporate governance. This article argues that introducing environmental sustainability into EU mandatory disclosure aligns the institutional investors’ incentives with the interest of their beneficiaries and may foster the efficient inclusion of sustainability in corporate governance. The argument is threefold. Firstly, the EU Taxonomy may curb greenwashing by standardizing the disclosure of environmental sustainability. Secondly, this information may become salient for the beneficiaries as the same standards define the sustainability preferences to be considered in recommending and marketing financial products. Thirdly, sustainability disclosure prompts institutional investors to compete for sustainability-minded beneficiaries. Being unable to avoid unsustainable companies altogether, institutional investors are expected to cater to beneficiaries’ preferences for environmental sustainability using voice instead of exit.Alessio M. PaccesMDPI AGarticleenvironmental sustainabilitylaw and economicssecurities regulationcorporate governanceinstitutional investorsgreenwashingEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 12316, p 12316 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic environmental sustainability
law and economics
securities regulation
corporate governance
institutional investors
greenwashing
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
spellingShingle environmental sustainability
law and economics
securities regulation
corporate governance
institutional investors
greenwashing
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
Alessio M. Pacces
Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
description EU securities regulation has established a taxonomy of environmentally sustainable activities. This article discusses, from a law and economics standpoint, the potential of this taxonomy to support sustainable corporate governance. Corporate governance can be an efficient way to channel investor preferences towards sustainability because the concentration of institutional shareholding has lowered the transaction costs of shareholder action. However, there is a principal-agent problem between institutional investors and their beneficiaries, which depends on greenwashing and undermines sustainable corporate governance. This article argues that introducing environmental sustainability into EU mandatory disclosure aligns the institutional investors’ incentives with the interest of their beneficiaries and may foster the efficient inclusion of sustainability in corporate governance. The argument is threefold. Firstly, the EU Taxonomy may curb greenwashing by standardizing the disclosure of environmental sustainability. Secondly, this information may become salient for the beneficiaries as the same standards define the sustainability preferences to be considered in recommending and marketing financial products. Thirdly, sustainability disclosure prompts institutional investors to compete for sustainability-minded beneficiaries. Being unable to avoid unsustainable companies altogether, institutional investors are expected to cater to beneficiaries’ preferences for environmental sustainability using voice instead of exit.
format article
author Alessio M. Pacces
author_facet Alessio M. Pacces
author_sort Alessio M. Pacces
title Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
title_short Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
title_full Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
title_fullStr Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
title_full_unstemmed Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?
title_sort will the eu taxonomy regulation foster sustainable corporate governance?
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/e5a78aa04d6340f794da60a920bf93d5
work_keys_str_mv AT alessiompacces willtheeutaxonomyregulationfostersustainablecorporategovernance
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