The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices

The interaction of the EU institutions is aimed at aggregating a wide range of interests and ensuring the widest possible (preferably consensual) support for the policy. However, game theory reveals that the ordinary legislative procedure breeds competition between two co-legislators - the Council a...

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Autor principal:	N. Yu. Kaveshnikov
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN RU
Publicado:	MGIMO University Press 2021
Materias:	european union decision making procedures ordinary legislative procedure trialogues International relations JZ2-6530
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e5c93328abe3455d936cacdb8dce65fd
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e5c93328abe3455d936cacdb8dce65fd2021-11-23T14:50:42ZThe Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices2071-81602541-909910.24833/2071-8160-2021-1-76-126-147https://doaj.org/article/e5c93328abe3455d936cacdb8dce65fd2021-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/2666https://doaj.org/toc/2071-8160https://doaj.org/toc/2541-9099The interaction of the EU institutions is aimed at aggregating a wide range of interests and ensuring the widest possible (preferably consensual) support for the policy. However, game theory reveals that the ordinary legislative procedure breeds competition between two co-legislators - the Council and the European Parliament - that seek to reflect their preferences within the legislative draft. This study attempts to assess the development of cooperative practices in the ordinary legislative procedure (since its establishment under the name “codecision procedure”) and the importance of these practices for the effectiveness of the legislative process. The development of cooperative practices is illustrated by three examples. First, the transformation of the rules of the third reading. Second, peculiarities of the Conciliation Committee functioning. Third, the development of trialogues and their main features.According to the results of the study, the author concluded that a set of cooperative practices between the EU Council and the European Parliament has been formed within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure which is structured in a way that encourages co-legislators to cooperate and engage in intensive inter-institutional negotiations that complement the negotiations within each of the institutions. The reason for this is that the ordinary legislative procedure has a complex system of checks and balances. This allows a number of actors to block or delay the decision-making process. Complex procedure literally forces the EU institutions to come to a compromise. The ordinary legislative procedure as it was set out in the Treaties was supplemented by number of cooperative practices based on political agreements, which enhance a more effective interaction between institutions. The need to ensure the support of all (the vast majority) of the Member States in the Council and key political groups in the European Parliament prompts to take into account the whole spectrum of interests. As a result, it ensures high quality of decision-making process and high quality of governance.N. Yu. KaveshnikovMGIMO University Pressarticleeuropean uniondecision making proceduresordinary legislative proceduretrialoguesInternational relationsJZ2-6530ENRUVestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, Vol 14, Iss 1, Pp 126-147 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN RU
topic	european union decision making procedures ordinary legislative procedure trialogues International relations JZ2-6530
spellingShingle	european union decision making procedures ordinary legislative procedure trialogues International relations JZ2-6530 N. Yu. Kaveshnikov The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
description	The interaction of the EU institutions is aimed at aggregating a wide range of interests and ensuring the widest possible (preferably consensual) support for the policy. However, game theory reveals that the ordinary legislative procedure breeds competition between two co-legislators - the Council and the European Parliament - that seek to reflect their preferences within the legislative draft. This study attempts to assess the development of cooperative practices in the ordinary legislative procedure (since its establishment under the name “codecision procedure”) and the importance of these practices for the effectiveness of the legislative process. The development of cooperative practices is illustrated by three examples. First, the transformation of the rules of the third reading. Second, peculiarities of the Conciliation Committee functioning. Third, the development of trialogues and their main features.According to the results of the study, the author concluded that a set of cooperative practices between the EU Council and the European Parliament has been formed within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure which is structured in a way that encourages co-legislators to cooperate and engage in intensive inter-institutional negotiations that complement the negotiations within each of the institutions. The reason for this is that the ordinary legislative procedure has a complex system of checks and balances. This allows a number of actors to block or delay the decision-making process. Complex procedure literally forces the EU institutions to come to a compromise. The ordinary legislative procedure as it was set out in the Treaties was supplemented by number of cooperative practices based on political agreements, which enhance a more effective interaction between institutions. The need to ensure the support of all (the vast majority) of the Member States in the Council and key political groups in the European Parliament prompts to take into account the whole spectrum of interests. As a result, it ensures high quality of decision-making process and high quality of governance.
format	article
author	N. Yu. Kaveshnikov
author_facet	N. Yu. Kaveshnikov
author_sort	N. Yu. Kaveshnikov
title	The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
title_short	The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
title_full	The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
title_fullStr	The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
title_full_unstemmed	The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices
title_sort	ordinary legislative procedure in the eu as an example of cooperative practices
publisher	MGIMO University Press
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/e5c93328abe3455d936cacdb8dce65fd
work_keys_str_mv	AT nyukaveshnikov theordinarylegislativeprocedureintheeuasanexampleofcooperativepractices AT nyukaveshnikov ordinarylegislativeprocedureintheeuasanexampleofcooperativepractices
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The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the EU as an Example of Cooperative Practices

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