Generic Hardware Private Circuits

With an increasing number of mobile devices and their high accessibility, protecting the implementation of cryptographic functions in the presence of physical adversaries has become more relevant than ever. Over the last decade, a lion’s share of research in this area has been dedicated to developi...

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Autores principales:	David Knichel, Pascal Sasdrich, Amir Moradi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021
Materias:	Masking Generic and Composable Hardware Gadgets Automated Masking Side-Channel Analysis Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e79627f6befa47919559d5093c43e886
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e79627f6befa47919559d5093c43e8862021-11-19T14:36:10ZGeneric Hardware Private Circuits10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.323-3442569-2925https://doaj.org/article/e79627f6befa47919559d5093c43e8862021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9299https://doaj.org/toc/2569-2925 With an increasing number of mobile devices and their high accessibility, protecting the implementation of cryptographic functions in the presence of physical adversaries has become more relevant than ever. Over the last decade, a lion’s share of research in this area has been dedicated to developing countermeasures at an algorithmic level. Here, masking has proven to be a promising approach due to the possibility of formally proving the implementation’s security solely based on its algorithmic description by elegantly modeling the circuit behavior. Theoretically verifying the security of masked circuits becomes more and more challenging with increasing circuit complexity. This motivated the introduction of security notions that enable masking of single gates while still guaranteeing the security when the masked gates are composed. Systematic approaches to generate these masked gates – commonly referred to as gadgets – were restricted to very simple gates like 2-input AND gates. Simply substituting such small gates by a secure gadget usually leads to a large overhead in terms of fresh randomness and additional latency (register stages) being introduced to the design. In this work, we address these problems by presenting a generic framework to construct trivially composable and secure hardware gadgets for arbitrary vectorial Boolean functions, enabling the transformation of much larger sub-circuits into gadgets. In particular, we present a design methodology to generate first-order secure masked gadgets which is well-suited for integration into existing Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools for automated hardware masking as only the Boolean function expression is required. Furthermore, we practically verify our findings by conducting several case studies and show that our methodology outperforms various other masking schemes in terms of introduced latency or fresh randomness – especially for large circuits. David KnichelPascal SasdrichAmir MoradiRuhr-Universität BochumarticleMaskingGeneric and Composable Hardware GadgetsAutomated MaskingSide-Channel AnalysisComputer engineering. Computer hardwareTK7885-7895Information technologyT58.5-58.64ENTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2022, Iss 1 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Masking Generic and Composable Hardware Gadgets Automated Masking Side-Channel Analysis Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
spellingShingle	Masking Generic and Composable Hardware Gadgets Automated Masking Side-Channel Analysis Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64 David Knichel Pascal Sasdrich Amir Moradi Generic Hardware Private Circuits
description	With an increasing number of mobile devices and their high accessibility, protecting the implementation of cryptographic functions in the presence of physical adversaries has become more relevant than ever. Over the last decade, a lion’s share of research in this area has been dedicated to developing countermeasures at an algorithmic level. Here, masking has proven to be a promising approach due to the possibility of formally proving the implementation’s security solely based on its algorithmic description by elegantly modeling the circuit behavior. Theoretically verifying the security of masked circuits becomes more and more challenging with increasing circuit complexity. This motivated the introduction of security notions that enable masking of single gates while still guaranteeing the security when the masked gates are composed. Systematic approaches to generate these masked gates – commonly referred to as gadgets – were restricted to very simple gates like 2-input AND gates. Simply substituting such small gates by a secure gadget usually leads to a large overhead in terms of fresh randomness and additional latency (register stages) being introduced to the design. In this work, we address these problems by presenting a generic framework to construct trivially composable and secure hardware gadgets for arbitrary vectorial Boolean functions, enabling the transformation of much larger sub-circuits into gadgets. In particular, we present a design methodology to generate first-order secure masked gadgets which is well-suited for integration into existing Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools for automated hardware masking as only the Boolean function expression is required. Furthermore, we practically verify our findings by conducting several case studies and show that our methodology outperforms various other masking schemes in terms of introduced latency or fresh randomness – especially for large circuits.
format	article
author	David Knichel Pascal Sasdrich Amir Moradi
author_facet	David Knichel Pascal Sasdrich Amir Moradi
author_sort	David Knichel
title	Generic Hardware Private Circuits
title_short	Generic Hardware Private Circuits
title_full	Generic Hardware Private Circuits
title_fullStr	Generic Hardware Private Circuits
title_full_unstemmed	Generic Hardware Private Circuits
title_sort	generic hardware private circuits
publisher	Ruhr-Universität Bochum
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/e79627f6befa47919559d5093c43e886
work_keys_str_mv	AT davidknichel generichardwareprivatecircuits AT pascalsasdrich generichardwareprivatecircuits AT amirmoradi generichardwareprivatecircuits
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Generic Hardware Private Circuits

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