Liquidity Restrictions on Investment Funds: Are they a Response to Behavioral Bias?
Liquidity constraints imposed to shareholders of investment funds, also known as lock-up periods, represent an alternative that managers can use to implement and maintain long-term strategies. The academic literature suggests that, as a result of liquidity constraints, funds should deliver a premium...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN PT |
| Publicado: |
FUCAPE Business School
2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/e7e0cdfe545b4a25972ac0f83adf9172 |
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| Sumario: | Liquidity constraints imposed to shareholders of investment funds, also known as lock-up periods, represent an alternative that managers can use to implement and maintain long-term strategies. The academic literature suggests that, as a result of liquidity constraints, funds should deliver a premium to their shareholders, and previous studies have documented this effect. Based on this context, in this paper we analyze the effect of lock-up periods on the profitability of Brazilian multimarket funds. We used a sample composed by 4,662 multimarket funds in the period from January 2009 to February 2016. The results showed a positive effect of lock-up periods on the average profitability of the funds, as well as on their risk-adjusted return. Our discussion highlights arguments that some measures taken by fund managers to protect their strategies against impulsive behaviors of funds’ investors can present a positive effect on the performance of their funds. |
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