Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action

Paul Ricoeur claims in Freedom and Nature that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking about. Habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and...

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Autor principal:	James McGuirk
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	habit knowing phenomenology embodiment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e8211b4808c6458ebb2c7ab8907c7053
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e8211b4808c6458ebb2c7ab8907c70532021-12-02T12:19:25ZPhenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action10.13128/Phe_Mi-195562280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/e8211b4808c6458ebb2c7ab8907c70532016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7150https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Paul Ricoeur claims in Freedom and Nature that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking about. Habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. It has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a form to our world relations. But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? In ordinary discourse, habits are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act ‘before we know what we are doing’. In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. I will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to expression as subject. In doing so, I will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. Here, I will refer to the work of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. My claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. James McGuirkRosenberg & SellierarticlehabitknowingphenomenologyembodimentAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 6 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	habit knowing phenomenology embodiment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	habit knowing phenomenology embodiment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 James McGuirk Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
description	Paul Ricoeur claims in Freedom and Nature that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking about. Habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. It has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a form to our world relations. But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? In ordinary discourse, habits are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act ‘before we know what we are doing’. In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. I will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to expression as subject. In doing so, I will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. Here, I will refer to the work of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. My claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative.
format	article
author	James McGuirk
author_facet	James McGuirk
author_sort	James McGuirk
title	Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
title_short	Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
title_full	Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
title_fullStr	Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
title_full_unstemmed	Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action
title_sort	phenomenological considerations of habit: reason, knowing and self-presence in habitual action
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/e8211b4808c6458ebb2c7ab8907c7053
work_keys_str_mv	AT jamesmcguirk phenomenologicalconsiderationsofhabitreasonknowingandselfpresenceinhabitualaction
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Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action

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