Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics

Abstract This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics—pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics (PIID)—in which agents are matched in pairs, engage in a symmetric game, and imitate the opponent with a probability that depends on the difference in their payoffs. We provide a condit...

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Autores principales:	Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Nicola Campigotto
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/e8c66d4d163c4fa8847016f6797fbbbe
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:e8c66d4d163c4fa8847016f6797fbbbe2021-12-02T17:12:25ZPairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics10.1038/s41598-021-92512-52045-2322https://doaj.org/article/e8c66d4d163c4fa8847016f6797fbbbe2021-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-92512-5https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics—pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics (PIID)—in which agents are matched in pairs, engage in a symmetric game, and imitate the opponent with a probability that depends on the difference in their payoffs. We provide a condition on the underlying game, named supremacy, and show that the population state in which all agents play the supreme strategy is globally asymptotically stable. We extend the framework to allow for payoff uncertainty, and check the robustness of our results to the introduction of some heterogeneity in the revision protocol followed by agents. Finally, we show that PIID can allow the survival of strictly dominated strategies, leads to the emergence of inefficient conventions in social dilemmas, and makes assortment ineffective in promoting cooperation.Ennio BilanciniLeonardo BoncinelliNicola CampigottoNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Ennio Bilancini Leonardo Boncinelli Nicola Campigotto Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
description	Abstract This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics—pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics (PIID)—in which agents are matched in pairs, engage in a symmetric game, and imitate the opponent with a probability that depends on the difference in their payoffs. We provide a condition on the underlying game, named supremacy, and show that the population state in which all agents play the supreme strategy is globally asymptotically stable. We extend the framework to allow for payoff uncertainty, and check the robustness of our results to the introduction of some heterogeneity in the revision protocol followed by agents. Finally, we show that PIID can allow the survival of strictly dominated strategies, leads to the emergence of inefficient conventions in social dilemmas, and makes assortment ineffective in promoting cooperation.
format	article
author	Ennio Bilancini Leonardo Boncinelli Nicola Campigotto
author_facet	Ennio Bilancini Leonardo Boncinelli Nicola Campigotto
author_sort	Ennio Bilancini
title	Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
title_short	Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
title_full	Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
title_fullStr	Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
title_full_unstemmed	Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
title_sort	pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/e8c66d4d163c4fa8847016f6797fbbbe
work_keys_str_mv	AT enniobilancini pairwiseinteractandimitatedynamics AT leonardoboncinelli pairwiseinteractandimitatedynamics AT nicolacampigotto pairwiseinteractandimitatedynamics
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Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics

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