The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, co...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | ES |
| Publicado: |
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/e95c06bdc8b54316a9ec143a308cd956 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, consequently, what an intuitive belief as a case of non-inferential and a priori belief is. Following Church et al (2020), one main point of this research would be to highlight the link between intuitions and evidentialism, as it is considered in the evidential problem of evil. This will allow a moderate and empirically informed rationalist analysis of what is understood as evidence regarding the possible (or probable, in some readings) non-existence of God, if it is the case that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil (pointless evil) in the world. To strengthen this interpretation in favor of an a priori - a posteriori link as a way of responding to the argument of evil and its undercutting defeater role (Oliveira, 2020), two assumptions present in the discussion and their plausibility will be considered: that a priori reasons are not strictly understood as evidence for religious belief of a proposition p; and that the irrationality of religious belief arises from the absence of justification for the occurrence of an event of evil. I maintain that there is a tension between i) and ii), specifically regarding the absence of evidence that allows us to sustain the incompatibility between gratuitous evil and the non-existence of God.
|
|---|