The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal

This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, co...

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Autor principal: Rafael Miranda-Rojas
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Publicado: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana 2021
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:e95c06bdc8b54316a9ec143a308cd9562021-11-10T14:59:47ZThe role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal0120-131X2389-9980https://doaj.org/article/e95c06bdc8b54316a9ec143a308cd9562021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://revistas.upb.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones/article/view/7149https://doaj.org/toc/0120-131Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/2389-9980 This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, consequently, what an intuitive belief as a case of non-inferential and a priori belief is. Following Church et al (2020), one main point of this research would be to highlight the link between intuitions  and evidentialism, as it is considered in the evidential problem of evil. This will allow a moderate and empirically informed rationalist analysis of what is understood as evidence regarding the possible (or probable, in some readings) non-existence of God, if it is the case that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil (pointless evil) in the world. To strengthen this interpretation in favor of an a priori - a posteriori link as a way of responding to the argument of evil and its undercutting defeater role (Oliveira, 2020), two assumptions present in the discussion and their plausibility will be considered: that a priori reasons are not strictly understood as evidence for religious belief of a proposition p; and that the irrationality of religious belief arises from the absence of justification for the occurrence of an event of evil. I maintain that there is a tension between i) and ii), specifically regarding the absence of evidence that allows us to sustain the incompatibility between gratuitous evil and the non-existence of God. Rafael Miranda-RojasUniversidad Pontificia BolivarianaarticleEvilIrrationalityRationalityEvidenceIntuitionFallibilityThe BibleBS1-2970Practical TheologyBV1-5099Doctrinal TheologyBT10-1480ESCuestiones Teológicas, Vol 48, Iss 110 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language ES
topic Evil
Irrationality
Rationality
Evidence
Intuition
Fallibility
The Bible
BS1-2970
Practical Theology
BV1-5099
Doctrinal Theology
BT10-1480
spellingShingle Evil
Irrationality
Rationality
Evidence
Intuition
Fallibility
The Bible
BS1-2970
Practical Theology
BV1-5099
Doctrinal Theology
BT10-1480
Rafael Miranda-Rojas
The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
description This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, consequently, what an intuitive belief as a case of non-inferential and a priori belief is. Following Church et al (2020), one main point of this research would be to highlight the link between intuitions  and evidentialism, as it is considered in the evidential problem of evil. This will allow a moderate and empirically informed rationalist analysis of what is understood as evidence regarding the possible (or probable, in some readings) non-existence of God, if it is the case that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil (pointless evil) in the world. To strengthen this interpretation in favor of an a priori - a posteriori link as a way of responding to the argument of evil and its undercutting defeater role (Oliveira, 2020), two assumptions present in the discussion and their plausibility will be considered: that a priori reasons are not strictly understood as evidence for religious belief of a proposition p; and that the irrationality of religious belief arises from the absence of justification for the occurrence of an event of evil. I maintain that there is a tension between i) and ii), specifically regarding the absence of evidence that allows us to sustain the incompatibility between gratuitous evil and the non-existence of God.
format article
author Rafael Miranda-Rojas
author_facet Rafael Miranda-Rojas
author_sort Rafael Miranda-Rojas
title The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
title_short The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
title_full The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
title_fullStr The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
title_full_unstemmed The role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
title_sort role of intuitions on the evidential problem of evil: a moderate rationalist proposal
publisher Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/e95c06bdc8b54316a9ec143a308cd956
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