Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?
This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on govern...
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/ea0743924e2a45678ce949d49664cff4 |
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| Sumario: | This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency. |
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