Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution

The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregated infrastructure. On the other hand, trusted execution environments (TEEs), one of the most promising recent developmen...

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Autores principales:	Moritz Schneider, Aritra Dhar, Ivan Puddu, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Čapkun
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021
Materias:	Trusted execution environments RISC-V security Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/ea5953c723524c36b5b72728e25c6a3c
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:ea5953c723524c36b5b72728e25c6a3c2021-11-19T14:36:05ZComposite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.630-6562569-2925https://doaj.org/article/ea5953c723524c36b5b72728e25c6a3c2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9309https://doaj.org/toc/2569-2925 The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregated infrastructure. On the other hand, trusted execution environments (TEEs), one of the most promising recent developments in hardware security, can only protect code confined in the CPU, limiting TEEs’ potential and applicability to a handful of applications. We observe that the TEEs’ hardware trusted computing base (TCB) is fixed at design time, which in practice leads to using untrusted software to employ peripherals in TEEs. Based on this observation, we propose composite enclaves with a configurable hardware and software TCB, allowing enclaves access to multiple computing and IO resources. Finally, we present two case studies of composite enclaves: i) an FPGA platform based on RISC-V Keystone connected to emulated peripherals and sensors, and ii) a large-scale accelerator. These case studies showcase a flexible but small TCB (2.5 KLoC for IO peripherals and drivers), with a low-performance overhead (only around 220 additional cycles for a context switch), thus demonstrating the feasibility of our approach and showing that it can work with a wide range of specialized hardware. Moritz SchneiderAritra DharIvan PudduKari KostiainenSrdjan ČapkunRuhr-Universität BochumarticleTrusted execution environmentsRISC-V securityComputer engineering. Computer hardwareTK7885-7895Information technologyT58.5-58.64ENTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2022, Iss 1 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Trusted execution environments RISC-V security Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
spellingShingle	Trusted execution environments RISC-V security Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64 Moritz Schneider Aritra Dhar Ivan Puddu Kari Kostiainen Srdjan Čapkun Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
description	The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregated infrastructure. On the other hand, trusted execution environments (TEEs), one of the most promising recent developments in hardware security, can only protect code confined in the CPU, limiting TEEs’ potential and applicability to a handful of applications. We observe that the TEEs’ hardware trusted computing base (TCB) is fixed at design time, which in practice leads to using untrusted software to employ peripherals in TEEs. Based on this observation, we propose composite enclaves with a configurable hardware and software TCB, allowing enclaves access to multiple computing and IO resources. Finally, we present two case studies of composite enclaves: i) an FPGA platform based on RISC-V Keystone connected to emulated peripherals and sensors, and ii) a large-scale accelerator. These case studies showcase a flexible but small TCB (2.5 KLoC for IO peripherals and drivers), with a low-performance overhead (only around 220 additional cycles for a context switch), thus demonstrating the feasibility of our approach and showing that it can work with a wide range of specialized hardware.
format	article
author	Moritz Schneider Aritra Dhar Ivan Puddu Kari Kostiainen Srdjan Čapkun
author_facet	Moritz Schneider Aritra Dhar Ivan Puddu Kari Kostiainen Srdjan Čapkun
author_sort	Moritz Schneider
title	Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
title_short	Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
title_full	Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
title_fullStr	Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
title_full_unstemmed	Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
title_sort	composite enclaves: towards disaggregated trusted execution
publisher	Ruhr-Universität Bochum
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/ea5953c723524c36b5b72728e25c6a3c
work_keys_str_mv	AT moritzschneider compositeenclavestowardsdisaggregatedtrustedexecution AT aritradhar compositeenclavestowardsdisaggregatedtrustedexecution AT ivanpuddu compositeenclavestowardsdisaggregatedtrustedexecution AT karikostiainen compositeenclavestowardsdisaggregatedtrustedexecution AT srdjancapkun compositeenclavestowardsdisaggregatedtrustedexecution
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Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution

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