Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens

ABSTRACT If accidentally released, mammalian-transmissible influenza A/H5N1 viruses could pose a greater threat to public health than possibly any other infectious agent currently under study in laboratories, because of such viruses’ likely combination of transmissibility and virulence to humans. We...

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Autores principales:	Marc Lipsitch, Barry R. Bloom
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	American Society for Microbiology 2012
Materias:	Microbiology QR1-502
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/eccfdb19f5c74798b8fa0aa55691eb8a
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:eccfdb19f5c74798b8fa0aa55691eb8a2021-11-15T15:39:13ZRethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens10.1128/mBio.00360-122150-7511https://doaj.org/article/eccfdb19f5c74798b8fa0aa55691eb8a2012-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mBio.00360-12https://doaj.org/toc/2150-7511ABSTRACT If accidentally released, mammalian-transmissible influenza A/H5N1 viruses could pose a greater threat to public health than possibly any other infectious agent currently under study in laboratories, because of such viruses’ likely combination of transmissibility and virulence to humans. We advocate explicit risk-benefit assessments before work on such pathogens is permitted or funded, improvement of biosafety practices and enforcement, and harmonization of criteria for permitting such experiments across government agencies, as well as internationally. Such potential pandemic pathogens, as they have been called, jeopardize not only laboratory workers and their contacts, but also the wider population, who should be involved in assessments of when such risks are acceptable in the service of scientific knowledge that may itself bear major public health benefits.Marc LipsitchBarry R. BloomAmerican Society for MicrobiologyarticleMicrobiologyQR1-502ENmBio, Vol 3, Iss 5 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Microbiology QR1-502
spellingShingle	Microbiology QR1-502 Marc Lipsitch Barry R. Bloom Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
description	ABSTRACT If accidentally released, mammalian-transmissible influenza A/H5N1 viruses could pose a greater threat to public health than possibly any other infectious agent currently under study in laboratories, because of such viruses’ likely combination of transmissibility and virulence to humans. We advocate explicit risk-benefit assessments before work on such pathogens is permitted or funded, improvement of biosafety practices and enforcement, and harmonization of criteria for permitting such experiments across government agencies, as well as internationally. Such potential pandemic pathogens, as they have been called, jeopardize not only laboratory workers and their contacts, but also the wider population, who should be involved in assessments of when such risks are acceptable in the service of scientific knowledge that may itself bear major public health benefits.
format	article
author	Marc Lipsitch Barry R. Bloom
author_facet	Marc Lipsitch Barry R. Bloom
author_sort	Marc Lipsitch
title	Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
title_short	Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
title_full	Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
title_fullStr	Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
title_full_unstemmed	Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens
title_sort	rethinking biosafety in research on potential pandemic pathogens
publisher	American Society for Microbiology
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/eccfdb19f5c74798b8fa0aa55691eb8a
work_keys_str_mv	AT marclipsitch rethinkingbiosafetyinresearchonpotentialpandemicpathogens AT barryrbloom rethinkingbiosafetyinresearchonpotentialpandemicpathogens
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Rethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens

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