Challenging the Constitutive Rules Inviolability Dogma
According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules. In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by a...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Language: | EN FR IT |
| Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/ecdac3b1e29d41d1be30909af59a5e29 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules. In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by asking the following question: is it possible to have violations of constitutive rules? We will argue that a parametrical approach to constitutive rules can do away with the inviolability dogma. As a result, our approach allows for violations and introduces two different ways of exiting a game (semantic exit vs. practical exit).
|
|---|