Value and Scale: Some Observations and a Proposal
In this paper, I investigate the scalar semantics of evaluative adjective in general, and of good in particular. Lassiter (2017) has argued that good, when taking propositions as arguments, has an interval scale. I argue that there’s evidence in support of the view that good, when taking individuals...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | CS EN SK |
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Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28306 https://doaj.org/article/ed57e37eca39470695566f9853faa55b |
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| Sumario: | In this paper, I investigate the scalar semantics of evaluative adjective in general, and of good in particular. Lassiter (2017) has argued that good, when taking propositions as arguments, has an interval scale. I argue that there’s evidence in support of the view that good, when taking individuals as argument, has a scale that is stronger than interval, but weaker than ratio. In particular, I propose that individual-level good has a “round” ratio scale, which allows a broader set of ratio transformations than standard ratio scales. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that good admits round ratio modifiers (twice as good), but eschews precise ones (# 1.38x as good). An important consequence of this view is that the scales of individual and propositional-level good are severed. |
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