Does Ontogenesis of Social Ontology Start with Pretence?
Rakoczy and Tomasello follow Searle in claiming that rule games need status function assignment and constitutive rules. But, in the case of pretend play, it is not easy to put together these notions with the natural world knowledge necessary to engage in it. If we consider the pretended scenario as...
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Autor principal: | Gaetano Albergo |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/ed5c78c844e54436ab97f3b9aa63dfe9 |
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