Does Ontogenesis of Social Ontology Start with Pretence?
Rakoczy and Tomasello follow Searle in claiming that rule games need status function assignment and constitutive rules. But, in the case of pretend play, it is not easy to put together these notions with the natural world knowledge necessary to engage in it. If we consider the pretended scenario as...
Saved in:
Main Author: | Gaetano Albergo |
---|---|
Format: | article |
Language: | EN FR IT |
Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/ed5c78c844e54436ab97f3b9aa63dfe9 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
-
The First-Person Perspective Requirement in Pretense
by: Gaetano Albergo
Published: (2016) -
The Background Power in Searle’s Social Ontology
by: Olimpia Loddo
Published: (2016) -
Joint Commitment, Human Life and Social Ontology
by: Francesca De Vecchi, et al.
Published: (2016) -
Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility
by: Sofia Bonicalzi
Published: (2016) -
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology
by: Andrea Giannotta
Published: (2018)