Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Abstract Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation...

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Autores principales:	Sanghun Lee, Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/ee856d05f3f0467c8aacc5c7da0f5e06
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:ee856d05f3f0467c8aacc5c7da0f5e062021-12-02T15:39:51ZLocal stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity10.1038/s41598-021-93598-72045-2322https://doaj.org/article/ee856d05f3f0467c8aacc5c7da0f5e062021-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-93598-7https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.Sanghun LeeYohsuke MuraseSeung Ki BaekNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-13 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Sanghun Lee Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
description	Abstract Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.
format	article
author	Sanghun Lee Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek
author_facet	Sanghun Lee Yohsuke Murase Seung Ki Baek
author_sort	Sanghun Lee
title	Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
title_short	Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
title_full	Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
title_fullStr	Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
title_full_unstemmed	Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
title_sort	local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/ee856d05f3f0467c8aacc5c7da0f5e06
work_keys_str_mv	AT sanghunlee localstabilityofcooperationinacontinuousmodelofindirectreciprocity AT yohsukemurase localstabilityofcooperationinacontinuousmodelofindirectreciprocity AT seungkibaek localstabilityofcooperationinacontinuousmodelofindirectreciprocity
_version_	1718385908057636864

Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

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