The Rationalities of Emotion
I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivati...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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oai:doaj.org-article:ef988e566f4d456f828b49b40038d05a2021-12-02T10:15:20ZThe Rationalities of Emotion10.13128/Phe_Mi-201052280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/ef988e566f4d456f828b49b40038d05a2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7242https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in virtue of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account. Cecilea MunRosenberg & SellierarticleemotionsrationalityirrationalityknowledgeAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 11 (2017) |
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DOAJ |
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EN FR IT |
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emotions rationality irrationality knowledge Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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emotions rationality irrationality knowledge Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Cecilea Mun The Rationalities of Emotion |
description |
I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in virtue of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account.
|
format |
article |
author |
Cecilea Mun |
author_facet |
Cecilea Mun |
author_sort |
Cecilea Mun |
title |
The Rationalities of Emotion |
title_short |
The Rationalities of Emotion |
title_full |
The Rationalities of Emotion |
title_fullStr |
The Rationalities of Emotion |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Rationalities of Emotion |
title_sort |
rationalities of emotion |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/ef988e566f4d456f828b49b40038d05a |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT cecileamun therationalitiesofemotion AT cecileamun rationalitiesofemotion |
_version_ |
1718397496705679360 |