Animal Normativity

Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is...

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Autor principal:	Laura Danón
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2020
Materias:	primitive normativity ought-thoughts secondary representations animal minds Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f09e10ee51c84ba89e6914bbc879ada4
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:f09e10ee51c84ba89e6914bbc879ada4
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f09e10ee51c84ba89e6914bbc879ada42021-12-02T08:57:18ZAnimal Normativity10.13128/pam-80352280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/f09e10ee51c84ba89e6914bbc879ada42020-02-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/8035https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have first-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity. Laura DanónRosenberg & Sellierarticleprimitive normativityought-thoughtssecondary representationsanimal mindsAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 17 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	primitive normativity ought-thoughts secondary representations animal minds Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	primitive normativity ought-thoughts secondary representations animal minds Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Laura Danón Animal Normativity
description	Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have first-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
format	article
author	Laura Danón
author_facet	Laura Danón
author_sort	Laura Danón
title	Animal Normativity
title_short	Animal Normativity
title_full	Animal Normativity
title_fullStr	Animal Normativity
title_full_unstemmed	Animal Normativity
title_sort	animal normativity
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/f09e10ee51c84ba89e6914bbc879ada4
work_keys_str_mv	AT lauradanon animalnormativity
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Animal Normativity

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