Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks

In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or...

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Autores principales:	Jan Sebastian Götte, Björn Scheuermann
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021
Materias:	hardware security implementation smart cards electronic commerce Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f0bdf645304341029b40af31a9f9d6c1
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f0bdf645304341029b40af31a9f9d6c12021-11-19T14:36:14ZCan’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.69-932569-2925https://doaj.org/article/f0bdf645304341029b40af31a9f9d6c12021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9290https://doaj.org/toc/2569-2925 In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or volume. Our approach is novel in that we reduce the sensitivity requirement of security meshes and other sensors and increase the complexity of any manipulations by rotating the security mesh or sensor at high speed—thereby presenting a moving target to an attacker. Attempts to stop the rotation are easily monitored with commercial MEMS accelerometers and gyroscopes. Our approach leads to an HSM that can easily be built from off-the-shelf parts by any university electronics lab, yet offers a level of security that is comparable to commercial HSMs. We have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype that demonstrates solutions to the concept’s main engineering challenges. As part of this proof-of-concept, we have found that a system using a coarse security mesh made from commercial printed circuit boards and an automotive high-g-force accelerometer already provides a useful level of security. Jan Sebastian GötteBjörn ScheuermannRuhr-Universität Bochumarticlehardware securityimplementationsmart cardselectronic commerceComputer engineering. Computer hardwareTK7885-7895Information technologyT58.5-58.64ENTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2022, Iss 1 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	hardware security implementation smart cards electronic commerce Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64
spellingShingle	hardware security implementation smart cards electronic commerce Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64 Jan Sebastian Götte Björn Scheuermann Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
description	In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or volume. Our approach is novel in that we reduce the sensitivity requirement of security meshes and other sensors and increase the complexity of any manipulations by rotating the security mesh or sensor at high speed—thereby presenting a moving target to an attacker. Attempts to stop the rotation are easily monitored with commercial MEMS accelerometers and gyroscopes. Our approach leads to an HSM that can easily be built from off-the-shelf parts by any university electronics lab, yet offers a level of security that is comparable to commercial HSMs. We have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype that demonstrates solutions to the concept’s main engineering challenges. As part of this proof-of-concept, we have found that a system using a coarse security mesh made from commercial printed circuit boards and an automotive high-g-force accelerometer already provides a useful level of security.
format	article
author	Jan Sebastian Götte Björn Scheuermann
author_facet	Jan Sebastian Götte Björn Scheuermann
author_sort	Jan Sebastian Götte
title	Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
title_short	Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
title_full	Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
title_fullStr	Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
title_full_unstemmed	Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks
title_sort	can’t touch this: inertial hsms thwart advanced physical attacks
publisher	Ruhr-Universität Bochum
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/f0bdf645304341029b40af31a9f9d6c1
work_keys_str_mv	AT jansebastiangotte canttouchthisinertialhsmsthwartadvancedphysicalattacks AT bjornscheuermann canttouchthisinertialhsmsthwartadvancedphysicalattacks
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Can’t Touch This: Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks

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