Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe

Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenom...

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Autor principal:	Marco Arienti
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2018
Materias:	Walton depiction make-believe twofoldness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f10f068350ff426b9548ee629a86d8c7
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:f10f068350ff426b9548ee629a86d8c7
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f10f068350ff426b9548ee629a86d8c72021-12-02T10:23:37ZTwofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe10.13128/Phe_Mi-236652280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/f10f068350ff426b9548ee629a86d8c72018-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7313https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.Marco ArientiRosenberg & SellierarticleWaltondepictionmake-believetwofoldnessAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 14 (2018)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Walton depiction make-believe twofoldness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Walton depiction make-believe twofoldness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Marco Arienti Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
description	Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.
format	article
author	Marco Arienti
author_facet	Marco Arienti
author_sort	Marco Arienti
title	Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
title_short	Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
title_full	Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
title_fullStr	Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
title_full_unstemmed	Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
title_sort	twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of walton’s visual make-believe
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2018
url	https://doaj.org/article/f10f068350ff426b9548ee629a86d8c7
work_keys_str_mv	AT marcoarienti twofoldpictorialexperiencepropositionalimaginingandrecognitionalconceptsacritiqueofwaltonsvisualmakebelieve
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Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe

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