Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.

Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction...

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Autores principales:	Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, György Szabó
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2010
Materias:	Biology (General) QH301-705.5
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f2614a8a3f214892b62422ca301e3ce7
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f2614a8a3f214892b62422ca301e3ce72021-12-02T19:58:27ZEvolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.1553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758https://doaj.org/article/f2614a8a3f214892b62422ca301e3ce72010-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/20454464/pdf/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-734Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-7358Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ("defectors"), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called "cooperators" or "second-order free-riders"), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ("moralists"), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ("immoralists"). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the "second-order free-rider problem". Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ("who laughs last laughs best effect"). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an "unholy collaboration". Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of "moral behavior" by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.Dirk HelbingAttila SzolnokiMatjaz PercGyörgy SzabóPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleBiology (General)QH301-705.5ENPLoS Computational Biology, Vol 6, Iss 4, p e1000758 (2010)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Biology (General) QH301-705.5
spellingShingle	Biology (General) QH301-705.5 Dirk Helbing Attila Szolnoki Matjaz Perc György Szabó Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
description	Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ("defectors"), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called "cooperators" or "second-order free-riders"), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ("moralists"), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ("immoralists"). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the "second-order free-rider problem". Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ("who laughs last laughs best effect"). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an "unholy collaboration". Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of "moral behavior" by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
format	article
author	Dirk Helbing Attila Szolnoki Matjaz Perc György Szabó
author_facet	Dirk Helbing Attila Szolnoki Matjaz Perc György Szabó
author_sort	Dirk Helbing
title	Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
title_short	Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
title_full	Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
title_fullStr	Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
title_full_unstemmed	Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
title_sort	evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2010
url	https://doaj.org/article/f2614a8a3f214892b62422ca301e3ce7
work_keys_str_mv	AT dirkhelbing evolutionaryestablishmentofmoralanddoublemoralstandardsthroughspatialinteractions AT attilaszolnoki evolutionaryestablishmentofmoralanddoublemoralstandardsthroughspatialinteractions AT matjazperc evolutionaryestablishmentofmoralanddoublemoralstandardsthroughspatialinteractions AT gyorgyszabo evolutionaryestablishmentofmoralanddoublemoralstandardsthroughspatialinteractions
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Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.

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