Personal responsibility under totalitarian regimes
<p class="Abstract">After witnessing the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt realized that it is a misconception that the occurrence of international crimes (and radical evil) mostly implicates the work of people with evil motives. For this reason, she developed a new form of crimi...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Amsterdam Law Forum
2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/f2fdfdf6b5f642ec9200c328c379ae92 |
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| Sumario: | <p class="Abstract">After witnessing the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt realized that it is a misconception that the occurrence of international crimes (and radical evil) mostly implicates the work of people with evil motives. For this reason, she developed a new form of criminal liability that falls between the two forms of liability of traditional criminal law. By analyzing and emphasizing the role of the ‘hanger-on’ criminal, Arendt got convinced that, when international crimes take place, besides evil intentions or culpable negligence, also <em>thoughtlessness</em> should establish personal criminal liability for them, as when evil occurs without reflection upon it, it can spread limitlessly. Within this theory, each person participating in a bureaucratic institution that is part of a totalitarian regime should be held personally responsible. Although never implemented in practice, this way of reasoning is an interesting contribution to the thinking on international criminal law.</p> |
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