Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.

Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation...

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Autores principales:	Naoki Masuda, Mitsuhiro Nakamura
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2012
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f3481e3774cf49a08bbd29bbe49a97bd
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f3481e3774cf49a08bbd29bbe49a97bd2021-11-18T07:06:17ZCoevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0044169https://doaj.org/article/f3481e3774cf49a08bbd29bbe49a97bd2012-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/22970176/pdf/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees (i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the social dilemma.Naoki MasudaMitsuhiro NakamuraPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 7, Iss 9, p e44169 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Naoki Masuda Mitsuhiro Nakamura Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
description	Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees (i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the social dilemma.
format	article
author	Naoki Masuda Mitsuhiro Nakamura
author_facet	Naoki Masuda Mitsuhiro Nakamura
author_sort	Naoki Masuda
title	Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
title_short	Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
title_full	Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
title_fullStr	Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
title_full_unstemmed	Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
title_sort	coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/f3481e3774cf49a08bbd29bbe49a97bd
work_keys_str_mv	AT naokimasuda coevolutionoftrustfulbuyersandcooperativesellersinthetrustgame AT mitsuhironakamura coevolutionoftrustfulbuyersandcooperativesellersinthetrustgame
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Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.

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