Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy

In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall in...

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Autores principales:	Selene Arfini, Lorenzo Magnani
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
Materias:	knowledge avoidance willful ignorance embodied cognition epistemic feelings self-deception autonomy Psychology BF1-990
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f4688e256e634b9f9648f2bc26cca159
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f4688e256e634b9f9648f2bc26cca1592021-12-01T06:44:43ZEmbodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy1664-107810.3389/fpsyg.2021.769591https://doaj.org/article/f4688e256e634b9f9648f2bc26cca1592021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.769591/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/1664-1078In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall into different parts of the epistemic rationality-irrationality spectrum. We will adopt an epistemological and embodied perspective to propose a definition for both terms. Then, we will maintain that, while willful ignorance is involved in irrational patterns of reasoning and beliefs, knowledge avoidance should be considered epistemically rational under particular circumstances. We will begin our analysis by considering which of the two phenomena is involved in patterns of reasoning that are still amply recognized as irrational—as wishful thinking, self-deception, and akrasia. We will then discuss the impact of epistemic feelings—which are emotional events that depend on epistemic states—on agents' decision-making. Then, we will consider the impact of willful ignorance and knowledge avoidance on agents' autonomy. By considering these issues, we will argue that when agents are aware that they are avoiding certain information (and aware of what kind of feelings acquiring the information would trigger), knowledge avoidance should be considered a rational, autonomy-increasing, hope-depended selection of information.Selene ArfiniLorenzo MagnaniFrontiers Media S.A.articleknowledge avoidancewillful ignoranceembodied cognitionepistemic feelingsself-deceptionautonomyPsychologyBF1-990ENFrontiers in Psychology, Vol 12 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	knowledge avoidance willful ignorance embodied cognition epistemic feelings self-deception autonomy Psychology BF1-990
spellingShingle	knowledge avoidance willful ignorance embodied cognition epistemic feelings self-deception autonomy Psychology BF1-990 Selene Arfini Lorenzo Magnani Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
description	In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall into different parts of the epistemic rationality-irrationality spectrum. We will adopt an epistemological and embodied perspective to propose a definition for both terms. Then, we will maintain that, while willful ignorance is involved in irrational patterns of reasoning and beliefs, knowledge avoidance should be considered epistemically rational under particular circumstances. We will begin our analysis by considering which of the two phenomena is involved in patterns of reasoning that are still amply recognized as irrational—as wishful thinking, self-deception, and akrasia. We will then discuss the impact of epistemic feelings—which are emotional events that depend on epistemic states—on agents' decision-making. Then, we will consider the impact of willful ignorance and knowledge avoidance on agents' autonomy. By considering these issues, we will argue that when agents are aware that they are avoiding certain information (and aware of what kind of feelings acquiring the information would trigger), knowledge avoidance should be considered a rational, autonomy-increasing, hope-depended selection of information.
format	article
author	Selene Arfini Lorenzo Magnani
author_facet	Selene Arfini Lorenzo Magnani
author_sort	Selene Arfini
title	Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
title_short	Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
title_full	Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
title_fullStr	Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
title_full_unstemmed	Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy
title_sort	embodied irrationality? knowledge avoidance, willful ignorance, and the paradox of autonomy
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/f4688e256e634b9f9648f2bc26cca159
work_keys_str_mv	AT selenearfini embodiedirrationalityknowledgeavoidancewillfulignoranceandtheparadoxofautonomy AT lorenzomagnani embodiedirrationalityknowledgeavoidancewillfulignoranceandtheparadoxofautonomy
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Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy

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