The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...

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Autores principales:	Christian Hilbe, Maria Abou Chakra, Philipp M Altrock, Arne Traulsen
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e7
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e7
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e72021-11-18T07:41:38ZThe evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0066490https://doaj.org/article/f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e72013-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23799109/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.Christian HilbeMaria Abou ChakraPhilipp M AltrockArne TraulsenPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 8, Iss 6, p e66490 (2013)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Christian Hilbe Maria Abou Chakra Philipp M Altrock Arne Traulsen The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
description	In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.
format	article
author	Christian Hilbe Maria Abou Chakra Philipp M Altrock Arne Traulsen
author_facet	Christian Hilbe Maria Abou Chakra Philipp M Altrock Arne Traulsen
author_sort	Christian Hilbe
title	The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
title_short	The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
title_full	The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
title_fullStr	The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
title_full_unstemmed	The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
title_sort	evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2013
url	https://doaj.org/article/f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e7
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The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.

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