The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...

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Autores principales: Christian Hilbe, Maria Abou Chakra, Philipp M Altrock, Arne Traulsen
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e7
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