The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas.
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN |
| Publié: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2013
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/f51e49312a294428ad6e84af008b18e7 |
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